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iv

ARGUMENT
Crown Asphalt Products Co. ("CAPCO") incorrectly argues that (1) Frehner
Construction Co. ("Frehner") relied upon the improper Nevada statutory venue provision
and (2) that there is a factual dispute over whether the parties had contracted for a Nevada
venue. These arguments are misguided for the reasons set forth below.
I.

THE STATUTORY VENUE PROVISION IN NRS § 339.055 GOVERNS
ALL PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS.
A.

NRS § 408.363 Does Not Contain a Statutory Venue Provision.

Where two statutes conflict, the more specific statute will govern over the more
general statute. See Williams v. Public Service Comm % 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988);
see also Gaines v. State of Nevada, 998 P.2d 166, 170 (Nev. 2000). CAPCO incorrectly
asserts that NRS § 408.363 more specifically describes venue requirements than does
NRS § 339.055. NRS § 408.363 reads:
Claims against contractor's bond, action against surety.
1.
Any person who has furnished labor, materials, provisions,
implements, machinery, means of transportation or supplies used or
consumed by such contractor or his or its subcontractors in or about the
performance of the work contracted to be done, and whose claim therefor
has not been paid by such contractor or subcontractors, and who desires to
be protected under the bond, shall file with the Department a claim in
triplicate within 30 days from the date of final acceptance of the contract as
provided in NRS 408.387, and such claim shall be executed and verified
before a notary public and contain a statement that the same has not been
paid. One copy shall be filed in the office of the Department and the
remaining copies shall be forwarded to the contractor and surety.

1

2.
Any such person so filing a claim may at any time within 6
months thereafter commence an action against the surety or sureties on the
bond for the recovery of the amount of the claim and the filing of such
claims shall not constitute a claim against the Department. Failure to
commence such action upon the bond and the sureties within 6 months after
date of the Department's final acceptance will bar any right of action
against such surety or sureties.
See NRS § 408.363. This statute does not contain a statutory venue provision. It cannot
address venue more specifically than the statutory venue provision for all public works
projects found in NRS § 339.055 because it does not address venue at all. While NRS §
408.363 more fully describes the activity involved in the Boulder Highway Project, it
does not contain a statutory venue provision.
CAPCO does not argue that NRS § 408.363 contains a statutory venue provision.
It argues instead that NRS § 408.363 does not contain the venue selection language "shall be brought in the appropriate court of the political subdivision where the contract
for which the bond was given was to be performed" - from NRS § 339.055. There is no
need for NRS § 408.363 to contain this language because the statutory venue provision in
NRS § 339.055 covers all public works.
B.

NRS § 408.363 Does Not Supercede the Statutory Venue Provision in §
339.055.

NRS § 339.055 is a statutory venue provision that applies to bonds involving all
public works projects in Nevada. It states:
1.
Every action on a payment bond as provided in NRS 339.035
shall be brought in the appropriate court of the political subdivision where
the contract for which the bond was given was to be performed.
2

NRS § 339.055. NRS § 339.055 applies to "any claimant who has performed labor or
furnished material in the prosecution of the work provided for in any contract for which a
payment bond has been given pursuant to the provisions of subsection 1 of NRS
339.025." See NRS § 339.035. NRS § 339.025(1) in turn requires contractors to furnish
performance and payment bonds "[b]efore any contract, except one subject to the
provisions of chapter 408 of NRS, exceeding $35,000 for any project for the new
construction, repair or reconstruction of any public building or other public work or
public improvement of any contracting body is awarded to any contractor." NRS §
339.025.
Although NRS § 339.025 specifically excludes Chapter 408, it deals with bonding
requirements, not bonding disputes. The Nevada legislature specifically instituted a
statutory venue provision in NRS § 339.055 to govern all bonding disputes arising from
public works projects. The construction of highways, roads and transportation facilities
are public works projects. NRS § 408.363 provides special requirements for filing claims
relating to highways, roads and transportation facilities with the transportation
department, but it contains no language that supercedes the statutory venue provision in
NRS § 339.055 that applies to all public works projects.
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C.

Upholding the Statutory Venue Provision in NRS § 339.055 Will Provide
the Most Efficient Resolution of the Dispute.

Courts have considered factors such as the proximity of witnesses and evidence to
the place of trial in upholding forum selection clauses that require litigation over bonding
to occur in the jurisdiction where the construction took place. See St. Paul Fire and'
Marine Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 401 F. Supp. 927 930 (D. Mass. 1975)
(Citations omitted). In this case, the construction occurred in Nevada, the witnesses are
located in Nevada and the relevant evidence is located in Nevada. Allowing this dispute
to proceed in Nevada will provide the most economic and efficient resolution.
II.

CAPCO CONTRACTED WITH FREHNER TO RESOLVE DISPUTES IN
NEVADA.
Frehner explicitly rejected CAPCO's original offer and then made a valid

counteroffer, which included a forum selection clause, that CAPCO accepted. CAPCO's
attempt to manufacture a factual issue concerning its consent to the forum selection
clause in Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order Form ignores the clear facts.
A.

Frehner Rejected Capco Js Offer and Made a Valid Counteroffer.

In Utah, "An offeree's proposal of different terms from those of the offer
constitutes a counteroffer." Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372,
1378 (Utah 1995); see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d § 82.
Frehner explicitly refused to enter into a contract based upon CAPCO's proposed
Asphalt Sales Contract. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack, \ 5, attached hereto as Exhibit
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A. After rejecting CAPCO's offer, Frehner extended a counteroffer in the form of its
Bulk Purchase Order Form. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack, ^| 5, attached hereto as
Exhibit A. CAPCO acknowledges that Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order Form constituted
a counteroffer and that this counteroffer was valid in its brief, stating "Five weeks later,
Frehner submitted its own form as a counteroffer." See Respondent's Brief, at 15.
B.

CAPCO Accepted Frehner's Counteroffer.

In Utah, "An acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an
objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully enforceable contract
has been made." Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St, George, 898 P.2d at 1376. "An
acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer...or it
is a rejection of the offer." Id. "An acceptance may be implied from acts or conduct, and
performance by the offeree of the promise requested may constitute an acceptance." See
17AAm.Jur. 2d § 96.
CAPCO expressly accepted Frehner's counteroffer. See Affidavit of Michael C.
Pack, Tj 6, attached hereto as Exhibit A. CAPCO further manifested its acceptance by
performing according to the terms of Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order Form. During the
course of the Boulder Highway Project, the counteroffer governed payment and other
practices to which the parties adhered. See Affidavit of Michael Pack, Tflj 9-12, attached
hereto as Exhibit A. By performing according to the terms of Frehner's counteroffer,
CAPCO clearly manifested its acceptance of the terms of that offer.
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C.

UCC § 2-20 7 Is Inapplicable Because Frehner Rejected CAPCO's Offer.

CAPCO erroneously cites UCC § 2-207 (identical to UCA. § 70A-2-207 and NRS
§ 104.2207) to argue that Frehner's counteroffer constituted an acceptance under the
UCC with a disagreement as to the term for forum selection. UCC § 2-207 reads:
Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation,
1.
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on
assent to the additional or different terms.
2.
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless:
(a)

The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer;

(b)

They materially alter it; or

(c)

Notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.

3.
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of
the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of
the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of this chapter.
UCC §2-207.
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hereto as Exhibit A. No agreement was reached until CAPCO accepted Frehner's
counteroffer, thus UCC § 2-207 is inapplicable.
D.

£^p(jQ Cannot Argue Ren
Frehner's
Counteroffer,

CAPCO cannot perform under the terms of the counteroffer and later argue that
the terms do not apply whei 1 a dispute arises. The
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tah Supreme Court has noted,

"Eqi lily will not permit a part}' to accept p a lormaiKv
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the evidence, as a basis to substantiate an assertion of indefiniteness." Woolsey v. Brown,
539 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah 1975). Although Woolsey dealt with specific performance in
a real estate dispute, the court's reasoning applies to the present situation. If CAPCO
believed that the forum selection clause contained in the counteroffer was invalid, it
should have stated so before it agreed to the terms and began performance. CAPCO
cannot wait until a dispute arises to raise the issue of differing forum selection clauses
withFrehner.
E.

Even If the UCCIs Applicable, CAPCO Dealt with Frehner in Bad Faith
in Violation of UCC § 1-203.

UCC § 1-203 states, "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement." See UCC § 1-203, codified in Utah at
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 and codified in Nevada at NRS 104.1203.
CAPCO is violating the UCC's good faith requirement by attempting to state
retroactively that it did not agree to Frehner's forum selection clause. CAPCO cannot
rely upon the UCC to govern the differences between the forms when those differences
only arise due to CAPCO's failure to notify Frehner that it disputed the Bulk Purchase
Order Form terms in violation of the UCC requirement to deal in good faith. If CAPCO
disputed the forum selection clause in Frehner's counteroffer, it should not have accepted
the counteroffer and it should not have performed its contractual duty. CAPCO cannot
assert now that it did not assent to Frehner's forum selection clause, and therefore, a
"battle of the forms" arises in which the prevailing clause is determined by the UCC.
8
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For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be reversed.
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DAVID W.SLAUGH H U ,l ISH HIVII)
JILL L. DUNYON (USB# 5948)
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Attorneys for Defendants
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Post Office Box 45000
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INTHETFilKw JUD1C1A
STATE OF UTAH

CROWN ASPHALT PRODUCTS

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL C. PACK

COM P ANY a \ Tlah corporation,
F

••!••••<-

Civil No. 030922467

vs.
I'REHNI.R CONSIRUCIK'IM '
a Nevada corporation and S At1 ECO
INSURANCE C< »MAPNY OF AMERICA,
a Washington *., .• -t;.'

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

I

STATE OF NFA •
: ss.
<

)

I, Michael C. Pack, having first been duly sworn, deposes and says*.
1.
rnnlkT.

I am over the age of 21 and am otherwise competent to testify as a witness in this

2.

I am the president of Frehner Construction Co, Inc. ("Frehner").

3.

Frehner has been doing business with Crown Asphalt Products Company or its

predecessors ("Crown") for approximately 20 years. Throughout that relationship, all Frehner's
purchases of product from Crown have been under terms of Frehner's purchase order contracts,
in form and content substantially the same as the Bulk Purchase Order involved in this litigation.
4.

Frehner rejected the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract which is the subject of

this litigation.
5.

I informed Crown that Frehner would not sign Crown's proposed Asphalt Sales

Contract. I also informed Crown that Crown was welcome to furnish product to Frehner, but that
any Frehner purchase would be under the terms of Frehner's standard purchase order agreement,
or not at all.
6.

Crown agreed that it would accept and furnish product for the Boulder Highway

Project under Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order. Crown and Frehner understood at that time that
Frehner would not sign Crown's Asphalt Sales Contract. Crown ultimately did furnish product
for the Boulder Highway Project, some of which was rejected by the Nevada Department of
Transportation for failure to comply with contract specifications.
7.

The Asphalt Sales Contract provided in conjunction with the Boulder Highway

Project was never signed by Frehner.
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8.

On or about March 8, 2002, Frehner provided a Bulk Purchase Order to Crown,

ordering the asphalt for the Boulder Highway Project.
9.

Crown delivered the Asphalt to the Boulder Highway Project during 2002,

without a signed Asphalt Sales Contract, after notice from Frehner that it would not purchase
product from Crown under such a contract, and after having received Frehner's Bulk Purchase
Order.
10.

During the course of construction of the Boulder Highway Project, the parties did

not adhere to the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract payment terms. Payment was made
consistent with the terms of Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order with no objection from Crown.
11.

During the course of construction of the Boulder Highway Project Frehner did not

provide to Crown scheduling information and "contacts in writing" as required by the Asphalt
Sales Contract, with no objection from Crown.
12.

Although the Bulk Purchase Order was not signed by Crown, it was the document

under which the parties were operating on the Boulder Highway Project. The Bulk Purchase
Order governed payment and other practices of the parties. Although Crown alleges in its
Complaint that the Asphalt Sales Contract was the controlling document, the parties did not
operate under the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract and the parties had expressly agreed to
conduct business under the Bulk Purchase Order.
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DATED this /y 4ay of November, 2003

MICHAEL C. PACK
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